政治学と広報ジャーナル
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概要

Urge For an Independent Judiciary or Just a Game of Thrones: A Jurisprudential and Comparitive Perspective

Ambuj Dixit

Now, in a recent development the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has struck down a central law aimed at forming a National Judicial Appointment Commission which was enacted vis. a vis. the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014. It may seem like another quotidian judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Court but it actually is the biggest crisis in the working of Indian model of separation of powers till date. It may seem like any other judgment of the Hon’ble court declaring ultra vires a law made by the legislature but in effect it undermines the competence of the legislature and the executive and gives a severe blow to the system of checks and balances as envisaged by our constitution makers. Was the court right in doing so? What were the reasons for which the court was forced to do so? Is the continuous interference in policy making on part of the court viable? Is it hampering the power of other organs of the state or just exercising the power of judicial review? Is it correct jurisprudentially and if not then what needs to be done? These are the sort of questions the author aims to answer by the medium of this present article for which the author has analyzed the situation in hand by using doctrines, case laws and his own opinions. In the end the author will try to suggest some workable solutions so that a system of checks and balances is maintained without hampering the independence of any of the organs of state.